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Abstract 
 
Not only is the participation of developing countries in international trade negotiations 
growing, so is their influence over the global trade agenda. This article highlights the 
increasing activism and impact of African states through a detailed study of the current 
Economic Partnership Agreement (EPAs) negotiations with the European Union (EU). In 
examining African resistance to EPAs, the article develops a constructivist approach to 
North-South trade negotiations that pays close attention to the role of development 
discourses. We argue that the growing willingness of African states to challenge the EU to 
deliver on its development promises during the decade-long EPA process was crucial to 
informing their sustained opposition to the EU‟s goal of completing a comprehensive set of 
sub-regional economic agreements. We document African resistance to EU trade diplomacy 
in the EPAs, exploring how these otherwise weak countries were able to pursue normative 
based negotiation strategies by recourse to the EU‟s promise of a „development partnership‟. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
During the last decade, African states have begun to develop a more active and confident 
approach to multilateral and regional economic negotiations in which they are involved. This 
is particularly clear in their attitude towards, and their preventative negotiating behaviour in, 
the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPAs) talks with the European Union (EU).
1
 While 
African negotiators still lack the highly resourced deliberative capacities of their European 
counterparts, they have successfully navigated the negotiations and enhanced their influence 
in EU-African regional economic governance processes. The capacity of African states was 
boosted by an extensive NGO campaign, which shaped the discursive practices within the 
negotiations (Del Felice 2012). While Africa‟s more active engagement in trade rule-making 
and regional economic policymaking has yet to produce significant policy shifts in Brussels, 
their increasing willingness and ability to challenge existing European ideas about what 
policies can best produce sustainable development within Africa has led to an argumentative 
process within the EPAs that is normatively as well as commercially driven.   
 
Mainstream positivist approaches to trade negotiations between so-called strong and weak 
actors have tended to explain bargaining outcomes almost exclusively in terms of 
asymmetries of material power. When they do consider the agency of the weak, positivists 
tend to see bargaining processes in terms of rational actions around calculations of economic 
interests, where weak actors influence outcomes by reducing power asymmetries through 
collective action strategies based on shared economic interests (Drahos 2003, Narlikar 2004, 
Steinberg 2002, Zartman 1971). Developing countries, for example, are seen to formulate a 
series of strategic coalitions in the World Trade Organization (WTO) to enhance their 
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bargaining power vis-à-vis major powers such as the United States (Narlikar 2003). Yet as 
Lee (2012) has demonstrated, this perspective overlooks the way in which the need to justify 
and legitimise behaviour can often delimit the bargaining power of states in multilateral 
negotiations. And, while a focus on rational calculations may provide insights into trade 
bargaining between weak actors in multilateral settings such as the WTO (and even this can 
be contested, see Lee 2007) such an approach fails to fully account for the effective agency of 
weak actors where collective action opportunities are absent or limited, such as bilateral trade 
negotiations. In such circumstances, we propose that a constructivist analysis of bargaining - 
one that focuses on how weak actors make use of rhetorical action to mitigate material power 
asymmetries in negotiations – can better capture African agency in the negotiation of EPAs in 
which normative discourses on development (rather than purely functional discussions of 
trade gains) are prevalent. 
 
Building on existing discursive approaches to bargaining (Risse 2000, Schimmelfennig 2001, 
Schimmelfennig 2009, Sharman 2007), our analysis brings African agency and its interaction 
with the EU to the forefront of an examination of EPA negotiations. We provide new 
empirical insights to explain effective African resistance to attempts by the EU to force 
agreement during a decade of bilateral negotiations with the various African sub-regions. 
Using EU and ACP official documentation, as well as qualitative data from interviews with 
trade negotiators and public speeches by leading officials, we highlight and explain the ways 
and means of African activism in the negotiation of EPAs. It is a case study of trade 
negotiations which seeks to explain how a discursive process around African development, as 
well as the norms of legitimate bargaining behaviour, provides opportunities for materially 
weak actors (African states) to challenge and resist materially strong actors (the EU). Our 
analysis of the argumentative dimension to the EPAs highlights how African countries 
communicate and imitate the EU‟s discourse of „development partnerships‟ and statements 
that EPAs must serve above all as „tools for development‟ as a means of challenging the 
proposed new trade agreements.   
 
Constructivist approaches have already documented how prevailing discourses are an 
important tool for dominant states to achieve policy goals in international politics (see 
Checkel 2004 for an excellent review of this literature). In this study of the role of discourse 
in the EPAs we highlight the role of the prevailing development discourse in the negotiations 
- a discourse initiated by Europeans - as, to borrow James C Scott‟s (1985) phrase a „weapon 
of the weak‟. Our purpose is to explore how subordinate African actors have made normative 
use of the European discourse of „development partnership‟ embedded in the EPAs to hold 
the EU accountable for their negotiating behaviour, and in so doing influence outcomes (in 
this case no agreement on comprehensive EPAs) in ways that would not be possible if the 
negotiations were determined by material power alone. 
 
We develop our argument using the „everyday international political economy‟ approach 
adopted by Sharman (2007) in a study of small tax haven state resistance to European 
attempts to regulate their activity. In this seminal study, Sharman highlights how small states 
such as Liechtenstein used the prevailing discourse of liberalization as a „mimetic challenge‟ 
to the EU (2007: 48).
2
 Mimetic challenge is a form of rhetorical action which involves 
mimicking the discourses and norms of your main protagonist in a negotiation. In this context 
Sharman uses it to refer specifically to Liechtenstein‟s imitation of the EU‟s language of open 
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markets and deregulation, which prevails in other negotiations such as the WTO, to highlight 
the contradiction in European attempts to introduce regulation in the banking and taxation 
sectors to control small state tax havens. In the EPAs, we see the African negotiators 
mimicking the EU‟s references to a „development partnership‟ in order to challenge the EU 
and resist European attempts to push through agreement. 
  
African negotiators were able to link EU discourses of development and its negotiating 
strategies in the EPAs to the EU‟s self-constructed identity as „normative power Europe‟, that 
is as a lead promoter of core principles such as sustainable development, equality and good 
governance on the global stage (Manners 2008). African negotiators had ample opportunities 
to mimic „normative power Europe‟ in the EPAs, not only in terms of the content of the EUs‟ 
proposals, but also the ways in which normative Europe was negotiating.     
 
We argue that while African mimetic challenges in the EPA negotiations have not led to 
modifications of European strategic behaviour in the negotiations in the way that 
Schimmelfennig (2001 and 2009) identifies in the EU enlargement negotiations (indeed 
European negotiating behaviour, as we highlight below, becomes more coercive following 
African mimicking of the development discourse) it has led to the prevalence of a norm-
based argumentative dimension to the EPAs. The arguments, as we discuss below, are 
focused on the (lack of) development content of the proposed agreements as well as the 
(perceived to be hostile) bargaining strategies of the EU negotiators. Similar norm-based 
arguments have been used by African countries in the WTO in the cotton negotiations (Lee 
2012) and the intellectual property negotiations (Morin & Gold 2010). Discursive strategies 
would thus appear to be a particularly effective approach for materially weak actors when 
they confront the materially strong.         
 
The article is structured in three parts. We begin by briefly highlighting the historical legacies 
of the current negotiations in order to contextualise the concept of „development partnership‟ 
as well as historically situate the current negotiating power of sub-regional African groups. 
We then discuss the EU‟s discourse of „development partnership‟. This is a particular way of 
conceptualising development relations that has resonance in the language of „association‟ 
found in earlier EU-African agreements. In the third part we analyse the how and why of 
Africa‟s discursive entrapment of the Europeans, highlighting the opportunities this has 
provided for a preventative approach to concluding full EPAs. 
 
Since 2002, the EU has been involved in a series of protracted negotiations over EPAs with 
the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of countries. EPAs are one of the key pillars 
of the Cotonou Agreement (signed in 2000) which  signified a major revision of the structure 
of the relationship between the two parties; replacing the bilateral arrangement with a set of 
regional relationships between the EU and seven sub-regions of the ACP grouping.
3
 This new 
negotiating structure has proven difficult to manage. While a full EPA agreement has been 
reached with the Caribbean region, only interim agreements (iEPAs) on trade in goods have 
been reached with the Pacific region and African sub-regions or, in some cases, only 
individual African countries. 
 
The proposed EPAs would also seek to restructure the trade relationship between the EU and 
the ACP countries by replacing the system of preferences with a system of reciprocity and the 
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creation of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) between the EU and the seven regions. A 
reciprocal trade relationship would provide open access to each other‟s markets and thus 
promote the growth of free trade between European and ACP countries more effectively. In 
so doing, it promises -according to European policymakers - a more effective means of 
achieving development goals than a system based on preferences, and it would also be 
compatible with WTO rules (Hinkle & Schiff 2004: 1322). The proposed EPAs would, 
however, also create a number of development problems for many African states including a 
loss of tariff revenue – which in some cases accounts for almost ten percent of government 
revenues (Hinkle & Schiff 2004: 1327).  Whether EPAs will promote development or better 
promote European economic growth at the expense of African development is the subject of 
much debate (Meyn 2004, Goodison 2007, McCarthy 2008, Bilal and Stevens 2009, Hurt 
2012). Given that comprehensive EPAs have not been completed with any of the African 
sub-regions, suggests that these scholarly concerns are shared by many African negotiators. 
 
We will turn to the details of the negotiations shortly. Before we do, however, it is worth 
reflecting briefly on the historical context of EU-ACP relations to demonstrate the legacies of 
this relationship, vís-a-vís the negotiating power of African states, as it is of specific 
relevance to the arguments made in the analysis that follows. 
 
EPA Negotiations in Historical Context 
 
One aspect of the Treaty of Rome which is often overlooked is the association agreement (in 
essence a free trade area) between the EU‟s founding member states and their colonies. 
Unsurprisingly, given the historical circumstances, the content of this initial relationship was 
not the result of intense negotiations between the two parties. The relationship was accorded 
a formal institutional arrangement when the first conventions were agreed between the 
Association of African States and Madagascar (AASM) and the EU. As Farrell suggests, the 
main driver behind these developments was a desire by European countries „to retain the 
economic links, the access to natural resources and raw materials and other strategic 
economic interests they had enjoyed under colonialism‟ (Farrell 2005: 267). 
 
Things changed quite significantly by the mid-1970s as the expanded group of newly 
independent associate countries had established the ACP group of states and entered into 
negotiations of the first Lomé Convention. Inspired by the calls for a New International 
Economic Order within the UN General Assembly, and the idea of commodity power, the 
ACP states negotiated a number of concessions from Europe. As Clapham suggests, this new 
global context meant that ACP states were able to negotiate from „something approaching a 
position of equality‟ (Clapham 1996: 99). Moreover, the ACP group of states, despite their 
heterogeneity, were able to demonstrate a significant degree of unity and strength as a 
negotiating group (Holland 2002: 33). The most significant changes in Lomé I were the 
inclusion of non-reciprocal trade preferences and a number of commodity protocols (bananas, 
beef, rum and sugar) whereby the EU gave a guaranteed price for a set quota of imports from 
ACP states. 
 
Notwithstanding the achievements of Lomé I, the EU-ACP relationship soon became 
reflective of the power asymmetry between the two parties. The concessions that were 
achieved by ACP states in Lomé I have since been progressively removed. During the 1980s, 
the broader neoliberal turn in development policy further influenced EU-ACP relations. This 
saw a shift away from the idea that developing countries should be protected from the global 
market to a firm belief in liberalization (Hurt 2003: 161). From the mid-1990s onwards, the 
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EU made it clear that it favoured a return to reciprocity in trade relations with the ACP states. 
This was justified by the EU for two main reasons. First, and the most important reason 
according to the European Commission, was the need for EU-ACP trade relations to satisfy 
WTO rules. Second, it was argued that Lomé trade preferences had failed to promote 
development in most parts of the ACP. In particular the Commission highlighted how the 
ACP‟s share of exports to the EU had fallen from 6.7 per cent in 1976 to 2.8 per cent in 1994 
(European Commission 1996: 20). It should be noted that the relative value of these trade 
preferences has declined significantly since Lomé I because the EU has committed to wider 
trade liberalization in multilateral agreements (Hurt 2003: 165), and in recent years has 
concluded a number of bilateral agreements. 
 
In sum, EPAs were an idea initially proposed by the European Commission during the 1990s. 
During the Cotonou Agreement negotiations there was little evidence of ACP states shaping 
the agenda. In 1997 at its first Summit of Heads of State and Government the ACP group 
adopted the Libreville Declaration which called for „the EU to maintain non-reciprocal trade 
preferences and market access‟ (ACP Heads of State and Government 1997: 7). Despite this 
the EU was able to include the plan for reciprocal EPA negotiations in the final Cotonou 
Agreement. As a result, the EU „saw its general approach win through‟ in all major aspects of 
the Cotonou negotiations (Bengtsson and Elgström 2012: 102). It is these historical 
foundations that have set the parameters for what African states could hope to achieve in the 
current EPA negotiations. 
 
The EU’s Development Discourse and EPAs 
 
Institutionally, EPA negotiations are delineated as „commercial‟ trade talks and not 
development policy, and are therefore led by Directorate General (DG) Trade instead of DG 
Development (recently re-named DG Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid). Although 
DG Trade tends to be more closely associated with the EU‟s economic interests, the image 
that the EU has sought to promote in the EPA negotiations is allied to the idea of „normative 
power‟ Europe. This concept has become popular in analyses of the EU‟s external relations. 
The suggestion is that the EU is founded on five core norms (peace, liberty, democracy, the 
rule of law, and respect for human rights), which it then seeks to promote in its external 
relations (Manners 2002: 242). Such an approach does tend to uncritically accept some of the 
more aspirational rhetoric of EU policymakers and we may want to dispute such claims (see 
Hurt 2012). Nevertheless, what it does highlight is the ideational dimension, which is 
significant in understanding the strategies that African states have adopted during the EPA 
negotiations. 
 
According to Bengtsson and Elgström, the EU has portrayed itself during the EPA 
negotiations as „a partner for development [and]…a promoter of norms‟ (2012: 103). This 
concept of „partnership‟, rather than „conditionality‟, became central to World Bank 
discourse in the late 1990s when it introduced its Comprehensive Development Framework 
(see Pender 2001). In fact in EU-ACP relations the use of such rhetoric can be traced back 
even further. Official EU discourse has employed the term „partnership‟ since Lomé I instead 
of the term „association‟ (Lister 2007: 77). 
 
At the core of the EU‟s portrayal of EPAs is a belief in the benefits of trade liberalization for 
development. This is, of course, a central assumption of neoliberal development discourse. 
Louis Michel, then European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid, argued 
in 2008 that „trade liberalization is a means of attaining development objectives…in this way, 
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EPAs will do much to facilitate trade between the EU and the ACP countries in goods and 
services, in terms of both imports and exports‟ (Michel 2008: 16). Similarly an official in DG 
Trade concluded that „the question is do we want to try and create more than tariff 
preferences for us and ACP countries...I think this is the added-value of the EPA‟.4  
 
Nevertheless, the Commission had initially envisaged that EPAs would exclusively address 
the trade pillar of the Cotonou Agreement, while the development dimension of EU-ACP 
relations would be dealt with separately through the European Development Fund (EDF). 
Consequently, the European Commission‟s negotiating mandate only covered trade and 
trade-related issues. At the same time, EPAs were promoted as a tool for development that 
„must be consistent with the objectives and principles of development policy‟ (European 
Commission 2002: Art. 4.2). The dichotomy between pro-development political rhetoric and 
the narrow definition of development pursued by DG Trade negotiators, who focused on 
trade-related gains rather than on a broader development dimension, raised strong criticism 
not only from ACP governments but also from civil society actors and even EU member 
states (see Lorenz 2011). The consistent claims by the European Commission that EPAs were 
primarily instruments for development made it increasingly difficult for them to avoid the 
accusation that they were not implementing such rhetoric in practice. 
 
Until well into the second phase of the negotiations, the Commission maintained its position 
that no additional finance would be provided for EPA support beyond the EDF. Towards the 
end of 2006 however, after facing growing protest by ACP governments and particularly 
international NGOs, complementary bilateral funds were provided under the so-called Aid for 
Trade initiative to support trade-related capacity and infrastructure building. This also led the 
Commission to concede that development issues would be included in the final agreements. 
And indeed, by the end of 2007, all iEPAs (except for the EAC) contained comprehensive, 
albeit non-binding provisions for development cooperation. 
 
What marks the EU‟s approach as rather unique is the associated belief in the developmental 
benefits of regional integration. Since the mid-1990s, regional integration has become a 
cornerstone of the EU‟s external relations. Seeing itself as „natural supporter of regional 
initiatives‟ ( European Commission 1996: 43-45), the promotion of outward-oriented regional 
integration in the relations with the ACP countries was emphasized in the Commission‟s 
Green Paper in 1996 that, along with other documents, had already introduced the idea of a 
future trade agreement to be negotiated based on regional ACP groups - the so-called 
Regional Economic Partnership Agreements (European Commission 1996: 54). The Green 
Paper argued that „for the ACP countries regional economic integration is an indispensable 
step towards their successful integration into the world economy‟ (Chapter V, A1 (c)), not 
only in their trade with external partners, but also to trigger domestic surplus production and 
support trade between each other, to create bigger and more attractive local markets for 
investment. 
 
Ten years later, in an early speech during his time as European Commissioner for Trade, 
Peter Mandelson reiterated such a position, suggesting that „EPAs are not typical, hard-nosed 
free trade agreements. I see them as tools for development and the promotion of regional 
economic integration. They must serve as stepping stones for the successful integration of 
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ACP countries in the global economy‟ (Mandelson 2005). The Commission‟s most recent 
Green Paper on development policy continues to demonstrate how the relationship between 
trade, development and regionalism is seen as forming a virtuous circle. The ethos of EPAs is 
encapsulated in the claim that „development usually involves the gradual liberalization of 
trade in goods and services in a favourable business environment so as to facilitate integration 
into the world economy and regional integration‟ (European Commission 2010b: 15). 
 
What makes EPA negotiations stand out from the EU‟s other bilateral trade negotiations is 
that the Commission has repeatedly argued that they are developmental and not determined 
by Europe‟s economic interests. In the words of Mandelson, „what we want in exchange is 
not commercial - I have no European business leaders knocking at my door demanding 
greater access to ACP markets - but a commitment to improving the business climate in your 
countries, for your benefit‟ (Mandelson 2004). This point was also emphasised in the 
European Commission‟s trade strategy document, Global Europe, published in 2006. ACP 
states are barely accorded any discussion in this document and a clear distinction is made 
with the EU‟s priority countries/regions, which are identified on the basis of market potential 
(European Commission 2006: 9).
5
 
 
It is this strong rhetorical focus by the European Commission on development and regional 
integration that has been at the heart of their approach to the EPA negotiations. We argue this 
is what provides the mimetic tool for the materially weaker African states to gain traction in 
these trade talks. The EU-led development discourse has created space for ACP states to 
pursue a strategy highlighting the disjuncture between the EU‟s rhetoric and the highly 
coercive negotiating tactics that have been adopted during the negotiating process. As one 
recent study concluded, „the perceived inconsistency between partnership rhetoric and actual 
behaviour in terms of pressure and bullying tends to weaken the legitimacy of the EU‟ 
(Bengtsson and Elgström 2012: 105). The following section considers how African states 
have adopted an approach guided by mimetic challenge in order to pursue a resistance 
strategy to the completion of comprehensive EPAs. 
 
African Resistance to EPAs 
 
Despite the EU‟s commitment to conclude the negotiations they continue to drag on. African 
states have demonstrated significant resistance in the face of the pressure applied by the 
European Commission to conclude full EPAs. As indicated in our earlier discussion of the 
historical context of the EPA negotiations, this constitutes an unprecedented development in 
Africa‟s relations with the EU. The EU seems incapable of wielding its significantly greater 
material power against African states to any good effect. This section explores how African 
states have gone about constructing a „mimetic challenge‟ within the negotiations in order to 
resist the pressures to sign full EPAs. 
 
The EU‟s desire to conclude comprehensive „WTO-plus‟ EPA agreements with all the ACP 
sub-regions by the initial deadline of 31 December 2007 was not fulfilled. All that has so far 
been agreed are iEPAs, signed mostly by non-LDCs, which only cover the trade in goods.
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Some countries, most notably Nigeria, have since reverted to the Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP). These iEPAs represent the absolute legal minimum to satisfy WTO rules. 
By the end of 2007, the status of the iEPAs was, however, not obvious, and the degree to 
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which the talks could be revised in a future negotiation process remained unclear. The 
European Commission sees them as „stepping stone‟ agreements to satisfy the expiry of the 
WTO waiver for Cotonou preferences at the end of 2007; since 2007, however, „African 
negotiators...have been able to block the negotiations over full EPAs and have thus had 
implications for European external trade‟ (Sicurelli 2010: 108). 
 
African leaders had emphatically voiced their reservations about the market access offered to 
the EU market in the EPA negotiations, both in negotiation meetings with their EU 
counterparts, as well as in multilateral events such as the Africa-EU Summit held in Lisbon in 
December 2007. On the one hand, they have argued that EPAs fail to address the inherent 
protectionism in the EU‟s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) (Sicurelli 2010: 89). On the 
other hand, they have highlighted how the hard-line conduct adopted by the EU negotiators 
did not live up to the idea of an economic „partnership‟. Senegalese President Abdoulaye 
Wade went as far as calling for an end to the negotiations in Lisbon, announcing that he was 
not willing to talk about the EPAs anymore: „We've said we rejected them - for us, it's 
finished...when we meet again, we'll discuss things, the EU will present their EPAs, and we 
will present something else‟ (Deutsche Welle 2007). 
 
His reaction was triggered by the EU being quite hostile in its approach to the EPA 
negotiations. Whilst the three most controversial „Singapore Issues‟ (competition policy, 
transparency in government procurement and national treatment for foreign investors) have 
remained off the agenda at the WTO since the collapse of the Cancún Ministerial in 2003,
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the EU has continued to pursue them in its EPA negotiations. In this sense, African leaders 
have accused the EU of trying to impose an agenda that is beyond the requirements necessary 
for WTO-compatibility. From their point of view the „inclusion of services, investment and 
other trade-related issues in the EPA negotiations reflected a fundamental shift in EU trade 
policy built on a more aggressive approach‟ (Heron and Siles-Brügge 2012: 255). Moreover, 
the persistence of the European negotiators to include the „Most-Favoured Nation‟ clause in 
EPAs constituted – and still constitutes – the most contentious issue for many African 
negotiators. They fear that this would severely undermine the autonomy of their 
policymaking in the future as it would require signatories to offer the EU matching trade 
preferences, to those that might be agreed in any future bilateral FTA agreed with another 
major trading partner. 
 
Although the EU has remained fully committed to concluding full EPAs, negotiations have 
not made significant progress, despite new deadlines having being set ambitiously on an 
annual basis for the last five years. With the appointment of Baroness Ashton as new EU 
Trade Commissioner in October 2008, hopes were high on both sides that negotiations would 
gain momentum. Participants agree that although the Commission‟s negotiating mandate did 
not change, the new Commissioner did introduce a less aggressive negotiating style and 
tone.
8
 Nevertheless, this shift failed to speed up the negotiation process and no agreement 
could be reached in any of the EPA groupings on the outstanding contentious issues. By June 
2010 the Commission officially admitted that „the process towards signing and applying 
iEPAs has effectively taken much longer than anticipated‟ (European Commission 2010a: 2). 
On the one hand, „EPA fatigue‟ has seized all parties to the negotiations and even the EU's 
open threats to withdraw market access could not be used as leverage (see Lorenz 2012). On 
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the other, trade under the iEPAs continues apparently as „business as usual‟ and therefore 
there remains little incentive for African negotiators to return to the negotiating table. 
 
The two proposals outlined by the European Commission in 2011 constituted yet another 
approach to „encourage‟ ACP states to make progress in EPA negotiations. Firstly, they 
released details of plans to significantly reduce the number of countries who will qualify for 
GSP status when the current scheme expires at the end of 2013 (European Commission 
2011a). This was followed by an announcement that preferential trade access will be removed 
for those ACP states who fail to demonstrate they are taking sufficient steps to ratify their 
EPAs by the beginning of 2014 (European Commission 2011b). African negotiators have 
been clear in their rejection of these most recent attempts by the European Commission to 
impose a new deadline. At a meeting of the Heads of the different regional organizations 
within the ACP and the main negotiators of EPAs, it was agreed that „the spirit of the 
partnership should be to ensure that content and not timing determines the conclusion of the 
EPAs‟ (ACP Secretariat 2011: 7). Following such criticisms the European Parliament voted 
in September 2012 to extend by two years- until the beginning of 2016 - the Commission‟s 
proposal to remove market access for those states who have not agreed an EPA.
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Explaining African resistance in the EPA negotiations 
 
Given the economic dependence of African states upon the EU and their relative weak 
negotiating capacity, their ability to resist completion of full EPAs is remarkable. During the 
early phase of the negotiations, DG Trade was seen by ACP negotiators as a „tough, 
confrontational, „mercantilist‟ negotiator that...paid scant attention to development concerns‟ 
(Elgström 2009: 25). This approach contrasted quite sharply with the EU‟s promise that 
EPAs would be a „tool of development‟ and a „partnership for development‟, which had 
contributed to a particular normative tone and set of promises that African negotiators have 
come back to repeatedly throughout the talks. 
 
During the early phase of the negotiations the ACP group as a whole was concerned with 
adding increased development finance to the scope of the negotiations. This was due to fears 
over the potential adjustment costs of trade liberalization, as a result of lost tariff revenues 
and the need for substantial investment in infrastructure. They argued in particular – albeit 
unsuccessfully as it turned out – for a separate adjustment fund in addition to finances 
provided through the EDF (Sicurelli 2010: 106). During this period, however, the European 
Commission maintained that specific provisions on development were not part of the EPA 
negotiations and that these remained within DG Development‟s remit. What concerned DG 
Trade most was securing agreements that would be WTO-compatible which led to an 
exclusive focus on trade liberalization on the side of the European negotiators. Their focus, 
however, underestimated the difficulty of negotiating when there exist several parallel trade 
regimes, most importantly the so-called „Everything but Arms‟ (EBA) initiative. 
 
In February 2001 the EU launched this initiative to allow for a continuation of non-reciprocal 
trade access for LDCs to the EU market. The EBA initiative, because of its exclusive focus 
on LDCs, does not require a waiver within the WTO. On the surface it seems like a beneficial 
scheme for LDCs and an example that demonstrates the EU‟s commitment to development. 
In reality, however, its economic impact is thought to be marginal given that most exports 
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already enter the EU duty-free under Cotonou preferences (Flint 2008: 73). Moreover, the 
politics of the EBA scheme can be related to the wider trade interests of the EU. In terms of 
EPAs, what it has done is create two tiers within the sub-regions that further complicates the 
negotiating process. On the one hand, it means that LDCs do not have much incentive to join 
regional EPAs given that they will already have duty-free access to the EU. Moreover, by 
signing a regional EPA they would be liable for a loss in tariff revenues as any regional 
grouping has to reduce duties on imports from the EU (Flint 2008: 26). On the other hand, 
governments questioned whether relying on the EBA initiative would constitute a viable 
alternative to an EPA due to its non-binding character, therefore not concluding an EPA 
could thus equally risk their preferential market access.
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African and other ACP states have expressed skepticism over the decoupling of trade and 
development at such an early stage of the negotiations and have argued that substantial 
institutional investment would be needed to harness the potential benefits of liberalization 
(Bengtsson and Elgström 2012: 104). While most accounts of the EPA negotiations merely 
refer to the negotiating principles established by the European Commission, the ACP had also 
published its own quite detailed guidelines for the EPA negotiations in 2002. These were 
broadly in line with those of the Commission, but in addition included ACP unity and 
solidarity, preservation and improvement of the Lomé Acquis, sustainability, coherence and 
consistency by the ACP states and „additionality [sic!] of resources and support for 
adjustment‟ (ACP Secretariat 2002: 8) as guiding principles. Additionally, apart from 
outlining the ACP‟s position on trade and trade-related issues, this document provides a 
section on development cooperation issues and legal issues as well as the ACP negotiating 
structure and the time line from June 2002 until December 2007. In retrospect, paragraph 43 
of the guidelines, which suggests the timeline „may have to be adapted in the light of future 
developments‟ reads more like a premonition than a proposition. 
 
In this first phase, however, while the ACP side did voice its concerns, achievements were 
nevertheless limited, even though their concerns were supported by an extensive NGO 
campaign in Europe and Africa.
11
 The central message of this campaign has been that EPAs 
are designed in line with the EU‟s commercial interests and not Africa‟s development needs. 
Some would argue that this campaign did not have a significant direct impact on policy 
outcomes or the negotiating position of the European Commission itself, despite the existence 
of an official consultation mechanism allowing for dialogue with civil society groups (Dür 
and De Bièvre 2007: 88-93). 
 
In late 2006 and 2007, however, this campaign by NGOs did gain momentum and ACP 
negotiators often echoed their arguments. Research conducted by Del Felice suggests that the 
extent of the campaign, and the level of criticism, was not expected by most European 
officials (2012: 12). Even though the European side did not openly admit to being under 
pressure as a result, it did feel that it had to engage with such criticism and improve its efforts 
to communicate its position on the developmental benefits of EPAs (Del Felice 2012: 15). 
For example, the European delegation to South Africa, who addressed the argument made by 
NGOs that the EU was imposing the deadline on the ACP countries in one of the EU's few 
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defensive publications as a 'myth of the EPA negotiations' (European Delegation to South 
Africa 2007). Moreover, research by Trommer suggests that, in the case of West Africa, by 
campaigning for EPAs to be more focused on the development needs of the region, 
transnational NGO networks have been able to influence „both the general public and 
decision-makers in West Africa‟ (Trommer 2011: 121). In the case of the SADC EPA group, 
negotiators and governments rather sang the song of the campaign to strengthen their 
negotiating position, whilst at the same time criticising the „packed and canned messages‟ of 
the NGOs.
12
 The discursive impact of the NGO campaign contributed to African states 
developing a more nuanced position beyond the argument of the development NGOs who 
polarised the debate by calling for an end to EPA negotiations. Ultimately many African 
states „would want to sign up to these EPAs, not because they believe it‟s the best rate or deal 
that they can get, but because it‟s the only one...to keep the preferential relationship with the 
EU‟.13 
 
Their discursive approach received further „hand ammunition to ACP negotiators‟ (Elgström 
2009: 26) from the debate that ensued within the EU in 2007, with critical voices against the 
negotiation approach of DG Trade coming from some member state governments (chiefly 
Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK). The European Parliament‟s 
Committee on Development also noted „the lack of a concrete development-friendly 
result...as demonstrated by the increasing concern and dissatisfaction of ACP countries‟ 
(European Parliament Committee on Development 2006: 6). 
  
DG Trade did indeed start to make more explicit references to development finance during 
2007 as the EPA negotiations became more intense. In the words of Mandelson, „with the 
support of the €23 billion European Development Fund and EU commitments to increase Aid 
for Trade, EPAs will not fail through a lack of financial support‟ (Mandelson 2007). DG 
Trade also committed the EU to remove tariffs and quotas on all exports (except rice and 
sugar) as part of the overall commitment to liberalizing „substantially all trade‟ in the EPAs. 
In part these changes can be understood to result from a process of mimetic challenge, 
whereby „the Commission became a victim of its own spin‟ (Elgström 2009: 30). In the 
search for alternatives, proposals ranged from requesting an extension to the Cotonou 
preferences through the prolongation of the WTO waiver, to the granting of GSP+ 
preferences to all ACP countries. The Commission refused to discuss any „Plan B‟ until 
November 2007. Instead it tried to push hard for completion of the EPAs (Mandelson 2007).  
This led to a final negotiation phase that the ACP Secretary General Sir John Kaputin 
characterized as „fraught with panic, confusion and disagreement‟ (Trade Negotiations 
Insights 2008). 
 
In the case of the SADC EPA group, the final meeting in Brussels to sign the iEPAs before 
the December deadline, on 23 November 2007, became so aggravated that the South African 
negotiators - together with their Namibian counterparts - did not return to the negotiating 
table after the morning session. Given South Africa's trade with the EU is already covered by 
a bilateral trade agreement they were able to make such a decision and this in turn led to 
Namibia refusing to sign the agreement. More broadly, the ACP Council of Ministers 
indicated in December 2007 that they were highly critical of „the enormous 
pressure…brought to bear on the ACP states by the European Commission‟ (ACP Council of 
Ministers 2007: 1). And yet, by 31 December 2007, only 20 ACP countries had initialed an 
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iEPA, in contrast to 43 ACP countries that had not committed to any agreement. Clearly, 
most of the African states that accepted iEPAs were non-LDCs that did so because they 
feared a loss of preferential trade access to the European market (which they remain 
significantly dependent on). As Flint (2008: 159) has argued, it was not that they felt 
genuinely committed to the eventual conclusion of full EPAs. This lack of ownership of the 
process adds to the sense of resentment felt by most African states towards EPAs. 
 
Since the flurry of negotiating activity towards the end of 2007 progress has been very slow 
in most of the African sub-regions. In the SADC EPA group the situation has not changed 
since the initial deadline, despite the EU endeavouring to convince South Africa to at least 
sign an iEPA. In the EAC, Kenya (as the only non-LDC in what is now a common market) 
refuses to negotiate even a bilateral iEPA which, they argue, could harm the thriving regional 
integration process within the EAC (Lorenz 2012). In the Eastern and Southern African 
region, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, and Zimbabwe did sign an iEPA and 
implementation officially began in May 2012. In general, however, resistance to full EPAs 
has continued. In particular, many of Africa‟s key states remain unconvinced by the claims of 
extra funding made by the European Commission due to an ever-increasing skepticism over 
the EU‟s proposed developmental strategy based on trade liberalization. 
 
In addition to contesting the consequences of EPAs for development, African states have 
been critical of how the European Commission has promoted their interpretation of regional 
integration, which is based very closely on its own „EU model‟ (Bengtsson and Elgström 
2012: 104). It has been noted that during the negotiations the European Commission often 
referred back to the positive experience of Europe in terms of regional integration (Faber & 
Orbie 2009: 7). However, here too there is a case of the rhetoric not matching the reality. 
During the EPA negotiations, as Farrell usefully reminds us, „the European preference is for a 
regionalism...which is somewhat at odds with the developmental path of European 
regionalism, where political cooperation and institution building preceded much of the 
economic liberalization‟ (Farrell 2010: 84). In addition, scholars have questioned the actual 
contribution of regional trade agreements to welfare and development (Bhagwati 1991, 
Krugman 1991) and in particular the real stimulating effects of trade and investment flows, 
especially actual implementation effects. As Schiff and Winters (2003) argue, regional 
integration amongst poor countries with different sizes and levels of development could lead 
to income divergence and welfare loss among the partners. 
 
In these circumstances the option of „mimetic challenge‟ becomes ever more significant to 
the influence of African states in the negotiation of EPAs. The ACP Council of Ministers 
indicated their concerns in 2007 when they stressed „the need to prioritize regional 
integration processes...over the free trade with the European Union‟ (2007: 2). The signing of 
iEPAs, and in particular the decision by the EU to allow individual countries to sign them, 
has exacerbated the problem of divisions within African sub-regions. Although European 
policymakers did belatedly acknowledge that the issue of regionalism is complicated, they 
continue to argue that it is not for the EU to decide what the constituency of African sub-
regions should be. As Louis Michel made clear in 2008, the EU‟s position is „neutral as to the 
make-up of regional integration areas, this matter is a sovereign decision of the ACP states‟ 
(2008: 44). 
 
The rhetorical claims made by the European Commission of the developmental benefits of 
the regional focus of EPA negotiations have also been challenged by African states. 
Discussing the EAC EPA negotiations, former Tanzanian President, Benjamin Mkapa, 
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argued that „regionally [the] EPA will jeopardise the flow of trade because locally produced 
goods are to be liberalised...[making] EAC countries less attractive for prospective free trade 
agreement (FTA) partners because they will have to compete with Europe in the regional 
market‟ (Mrindoko 2011). Within the SADC region, back in 2008, South African President at 
the time, Thabo Mbeki, suggested that the „various provisions in the economic partnership 
agreements would work in an adverse manner...with regard to [the] process of regional 
integration‟ (Mail and Guardian 2008). Similarly, speaking more broadly, ACP Secretary 
General, Mohamed Ibn Chambas concluded that „in light of the de-industrialising effects of 
wholesale trade liberalization, the reluctance to include a development component to the 
EPAs as some of our regional communities have insisted all along remains a disappointing 
reality‟ (ACP Secretariat 2012). Clearly, the unclear treatment of the development dimension 
as part of the EPAs has stirred heated discussions and continues to constitute a contentious 
„rhetorical issue‟ in on-going negotiations, as an observer expressed: „if you look at the 
purely technical perspective, these tensions [within the SADC EPA group] are hard to 
understand‟.14   
 
Conclusion 
 
In this article we have introduced the idea of discourse as a „weapon of the weak‟ in regional 
trade negotiations; an issue that has so far been overlooked by scholarly analysis of trade 
negotiations. We suggest that materially weak states can use prevailing discourses to remind 
more materially powerful states of their commitments and promises; imitating and 
accentuating dominant discourses becomes a source of influence. We highlighted how the 
negotiating process in the EPAs has been dominated by recourse to the prevailing discourse 
of development. This discourse has provided opportunities for African states to repeatedly 
prompt the EU about their public statements that above all else EPAs should be a „tool for 
development‟. African states have also drawn attention to European commitments to a 
„partnership‟ approach to the negotiation of EPAs. The attempt by the EU to use the EPAs to 
ensure „WTO-plus‟ commitments in its trade relations with African states, and the repeated 
threat to remove preferences if EPAs were not signed, allowed Africans to cry foul, 
strategically employ NGO support outside of the negotiations, and defy the Europeans. 
 
Because of the role discourse has played in the EPA negotiating process, the EU has become 
trapped within its own normative frame. African negotiators have exploited this European 
discursive weakness; „mimetically challenging‟ the EU over the content of their EPA 
proposals as well as drawing attention to EU negotiating behaviours that were clearly 
antithetical to the European commitment to a „development partnership‟. African states 
ensured that the European-led development discourse within the EPAs was directly linked to 
the social identity of the EU as a normative actor in the international system. Furthermore, 
development debates within the international public sphere, led by development NGOs, 
reinforced Africa‟s rhetorical entrapment of the EU. 
    
There are of course limits to such discursive power, and the difficulties that African states are 
facing in moving from a strategy of resistance to agenda-setting, are reflective of these limits.  
Such limitations to a more balanced relationship with the EU would be more decisive to the 
development prospects of African states if the global context had not changed somewhat 
since the launch of the EPA negotiations in 2002. In the wake of the global financial crisis, 
which began in 2008, African states have become even more skeptical of the potential 
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developmental impact of EPAs (Khumalo & Mulleta 2010: 210). In addition, the current 
financial crisis within Europe has raised questions over the EU‟s standing within the global 
order. As Andreasson suggests, „renewed attention to Africa is also part of a gradual but 
steady shift in the centre of gravity of the global economy, away from the core regions of the 
developed world, eastward and southward‟ (Andreasson 2011: 1168).  
 
Furthermore, while the EU remains a key destination for African exports, it is clear that the 
increasing role played in Africa‟s development by emerging powers – in particular China 
and, increasingly, India – does offer a serious alternative to the approach to trade and 
development being promoted by the EU. This issue has been downplayed persistently by 
European negotiators but the „Chinese elephant in the room‟ has added to the already tense 
negotiations.
15
 While the attractiveness of the European market keeps African states at the 
negotiating table, the existence of additional markets and alternative sources of financial aid 
that can seemingly be more easily gained by collaborating with, for example China, has 
changed the picture. In this changed context, regional economic relations with Europe remain 
significant, but the hurdles to achieving a genuine „development partnership‟ with this market 
make the new Asian alternatives all the more attractive. 
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